2018-19 CASBS fellow and USC associate professor of communication Mike Ananny chats with host John Markoff about the intersection of journalism, technology, and media regulation.
Mike Ananny's recent book "Networked Press Freedom: Creating Infrastructures for a Public Right to Hear" - MIT Press
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act - Wikipedia
Overview of the study of media effects - Wikipedia
CASBS symposium: Digital Media, the Public Sphere, and Democratic Governance
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
@casbsstanford on twitter
John Markoff: From the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, this is Human Centered. I sat down recently to speak with Mike Annony, an associate professor at USC Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism. Mike's research focuses on the intersection between technology companies and news organizations. We talked about the future of journalism and threats to the freedom of the press, such as fake news, Facebook, and new media regulations. We also discussed online identity, journalistic ethics, and how much effect media actually has on society. I wanted to sort of begin at the beginning in the sense of getting you to sort of define news in the digital era. Is it different?
Mike Ananny: So that's what the last book was sort of trying to focus on a little bit, is to say— what I was trying to— the starting point for that book was to say, you know, we used to think of journalism and news as what journalists did. So, and actually let me back up a little bit and say With my students sometimes I talk about 3 different things. I'll talk about journalism, news, and the press. So journalism is kind of what, you know, what you're doing, what a lot of people do. These are practices, these are traditions, these are ways of knowing, interviewing, producing different kinds of media, things that we want our students to go out in the world and do. That's sort of one way of understanding things. News is the content. It's the stuff that is circulating. It's the stuff that you are getting to see. What you see or not see. It's the form that a story might take. It's sort of the assumptions built into a genre of storytelling, whether it's long form, breaking news, all that stuff. And then the press is this third category that's sometimes harder, sometimes harder for my students to sort of wrap their head around, but the press is sort of all of the unwritten rules or conditions or all of the stuff that makes journalists be able to do one kind of work versus another kind of work, makes news be able to circulate. So we can think about the press as, you know, how does the Supreme Court understand journalistic freedom or shield laws? What kinds of news gets commodified and gets to be worth something online? What kind of news is seen as breaking norms or taboos around what can or can't be said? What are rules of even access? So who gets to be in a particular place? These are all sort of the rules and assumptions and conditions and laws and norms that sort of let journalists do their work but also let news circulate. So that's what I was trying to argue in the book, is to say all of those three levels, whether it's journalism, news, or the press, all of those have become sort of radically changed now because technology infuses all of that. It infuses all three of those layers.
John Markoff: You also have this idea or concept of networked journalism, which is an interesting one to me. And is that simply a description of the distribution mechanism, how it's changed? Is that what networked journalism is, or is it something else? For me, it's a little bit broader than that.
Mike Ananny: It's Partly even thinking about, so when I've spent time in newsrooms with journalists, one example is sort of to think about where are the analytics dashboards in newsrooms. And so a lot of newsrooms, when I go into them, journalists very much know whose stories are doing well on the web at any given moment. They know, and some of them, I mean Gawker used to have this leaderboard thing. You'd walk into their office and it was right at the front desk, there was this leaderboard. And different organizations do that differently. USA Today too. Yeah, yeah, totally, right. And what's on those columns is kind of—
John Markoff: 'Cause the Times has it on a webpage.
Mike Ananny: Yeah, and I've talked to Times journalists who like, but they won't, they can't or won't get access to the internal metrics, so they'll go to the outside and be like, who's most cited, who's most emailed, and then there's this like weird back and forth. So that's, I mean, for me that's just like one element of network journalism in the sense that it's a type of storytelling and imagined relationship to a public as well, or your public service, that seems to be working in relation to, it has to work in relation to these analytic systems and these metric systems because a lot of journalists say, well, I don't want to do things that are not circulating widely, that are not circulating with, quote, the right consumers. I mean, being able to describe which people are reading your story is also a pretty powerful thing. Like, you can, am I reaching people in a certain geographic location? Am I reaching people at a certain time of day? Am I reaching, you know, so the amount of personalization that you can get from these systems. I think, you know, I hear it consistently from journalists that it's in their minds when they're doing it. I don't think it's a simple story to say that journalists are, you know, serving that audience in a really sort of obvious or direct way. Like, I don't hear anybody say, "I just want to do the only stories that are going to get clicks." Like, I— that's— it's not as simple as that, but I think it's an element of what people talk about.
John Markoff: You're seen as something of an authority on fake news. I don't know if you intended that, but is that fair?
Mike Ananny: I mean, to be honest, there are people who are much more deeply embedded in the fake news world, I think. And also the term fake news, I think, is— I mean, I guess to the extent that I have any legitimacy in that conversation, it's that I'm often the person who's sort of saying this has been around for a long time, and the idea of mis- and disinformation is not new, and The Hearst Press comes to mind. Yes, exactly right. There's, you know, Benjamin Franklin was doing, quote, fake news in the, you know, 1700s. And so, yeah, to the extent that I do, I mostly sort of try to make historical connections and say, you know, this has come from somewhere, but then also try to put it in context and saying, well, that, you know, the speed and the scale and the scope of it and also the ability to diagnose it or even to trace, you know, the source of mis- or disinformation is That's a new thing.
John Markoff: After now 2 years reading reports on Cambridge Analytica, I feel like I still don't have a clear sense of whether they were instrumental in any way in influencing— well, the particular scenario is, were they deeply involved in suppressing black votes in targeted areas, which seems to be, if you're going to make the case that they played a role in the election, that's where you look. Do you have a perspective?
Mike Ananny: I don't. I mean, I look to people like Kathleen Hall Jamieson, I think has wrote a great book on that, where she, one of the arguments she makes is sort of like, we're actually probably never going to know because the idea that you can trace these, you know, again through this deterministic kind of ways and say, let me tell you the definitive story of how the 2016 election, I mean, I agree with her argument, which is we're probably not going to know that. Not only because these networks and systems are so complex that you can't actually run the clock back and replay what these algorithms did. It's just, it's not possible to do that kind of work. But also the thread that's more come, I think, to the surface, which I am much more sympathetic to, is that a lot of these, you know, media— quote media facts or media impacts— they're not nearly as strong as a lot of identity and value-based motivations for people doing things. So it's not like a Black voter in the rural South was going to vote a certain way and then they saw a piece of media that then changed their mind completely. And said, "Oh, I'm going to vote in some other way." That's just— we know that the media effects model, it's limited. It's very, very limited. And you don't get people swinging and changing their opinions or behaviors in that way. It's much more likely that your history and who you are and who your family is and your friends are and where you grew up and all of that stuff is so powerful, you just can't move it with that kind of work. And that's also the story of communication as a field, is we're always finding what's called the limited effects model. Most people want to think that there's some big hammer of impact that the media is having where they just swing opinion wildly or they do— it's just not the case. Like, it's, you know, ever since this stuff was studied systematically in the '30s and '40s, it's always been this limited effects model. For me, the 2016 and the misdisinformation story is, is kind of a story of how a lot of journalism and media got a little co-opted by some of these forces. So it's not that you reach directly into a voter and change that voter's mind; it's that you were able to create, you know, the sense of conflict that some journalists—not all, but some journalists—then wanted to report on the conflict. And then as soon as it then makes it into more mainstream, more sort of respectable, legitimate media sources that are saying, "Well, you know, who knows? Maybe these emails are a problem, or maybe they're not a problem, or maybe there's—" that it raised this specter of doubt, that I think some journalists were feeding on that doubt, then you don't— that's not a fake news story. That's a story of how journalistic storytelling happens. And that's—
John Markoff: I think that's a different thing. What would your response be— Stuart Russell, who is a Berkeley computer scientist, who's sort of an early AI guy, and he's very active in the campaign to stop robot weapons, but that's it. He also has this analysis about the engagement. You focus on algorithms today, so he basically makes this argument about polarization as being an artifact of the way these engagement algorithms run. And it's basically a very simple, you know, he says, look at this, is not a big AI system, this is 50 lines of Python code. Yeah, that has been developed to get people to, you know, and then that has this reinforcement effect that moves people in a direction, and it turns out it's There are two things going on.
Mike Ananny: Does that seem to make sense? Yeah, to me that rings true. That's very plausible. And I think you're— a bunch of things that are right in that. I think one is that the technology is not that complicated in what we're talking about. But I think what's happened is there's been this sort of perfect storm of some platforms, mostly Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, capturing a lot of people's online behavior and then using some pretty old tried techniques of sort of people are willing to click on or engage with things that are more emot— there's a valence issue, are more emotionally engaging, whether it's like positive emotion or negative emotion. We're suckers for emotion and we're just willing to do that stuff. And if I can set up a positive feedback loop of getting people to just keep engaging in emotional content, that's, that's the holy grail of advertising in a way.
John Markoff: And that's good work. And that leads to my next It's a sort of question, is McLuhan right? Is the medium the message? In the sense that I think about particularly the invention of the— well, they didn't invent it, but the Facebook newsfeed. And the difference between the Facebook newsfeed and a newspaper. A newspaper, there's a beginning and an end. You read the newspaper and you're done. You can read it again, but Facebook feed is an endless stream, and that to me seems like a very McLuhan-esque kind of difference. Does that—
Mike Ananny: Yeah, I think that's fair. I mean, I think I, I wouldn't totally get in the McLuhan camp for a lot of reasons, but I think the idea for me— so I position myself more as like a science technology scholar in a way, and one of the core ideas there is that the thing you're always concerned about is the relationship between the people and the technology. And if you ever find yourself talking about the effect or the impact of one on the other, then you're not framing the question properly. And so to me, it's like the newsfeed example is sort of a thing where what I want to study or want to know about or want to intervene into is to say, what's the relationship between the human and that ranking of stories or that feedback loop or that affective content or something? That's the thing I'm concerned about, because I would never say that there's a person who comes into this believing nothing and feeling nothing, and then they just get sucked into the newsfeed, and then that has the impact. So I wouldn't go so far as to say, you know, identity and culture and stuff doesn't matter. It's the medium that's doing all this forceful work.
John Markoff: There's a cascade of calls for either regulating and/or breaking up Facebook to deal with this problem. I was wondering if you've sort of thought about— I mean, you know, a day doesn't go by— I think Alex Stamos, who was their former chief security officer, recently called for Mark Zuckerberg to step down. Oh yeah, yeah.
Mike Ananny: Are we forced to use— Yeah.
John Markoff: So there is, you know, there is really a drumbeat.
Mike Ananny: Yeah, yeah. No, I think there is. Have you—
John Markoff: Do you have thoughts on the Facebook problem?
Mike Ananny: Yeah, no, it's a big problem. I mean, I— yeah, I do have thoughts. I guess— I mean, one is to say that I think some of this is sort of a moment of real— or should be a moment of realization where there were I think there were some academics and there were some sort of marginalized voices that were calling out the problems with Facebook and sort of this, that particular type of social media network a while ago. So when I read the founders or people saying like, "I never knew this was going to happen and this is brand new, unanticipated consequences," and there's a lot of sort of like goodwill that's given to— I'm not super sympathetic to that because I think a lot of it was about exploiting and is, you know, capitalizing on human attention and emotion in a way. So I'm not surprised necessarily that we've gotten to where we are. That said, I also think that, like, the idea of breaking up Facebook, I don't think that's a non-trivial thing to figure out how to do at all, given how intertwined both the data and the profiles and the relationships. Like, I— the idea that I could completely suck my data out of Google, for instance, instance, and have no interaction with Google, technologically I would want to see really details on how that would work, because I'm not sure it's possible in the way that they sort of— people who advocate breaking up it might be possible. I do think there could be a ton more transparency, there could be a ton more sort of regulation on how data gets shipped around from various places, but I'm not sure what it— I guess I'm not sure what it means to break it up in a way. I haven't seen the really low-level concrete example of like, show me how Instagram versus WhatsApp versus Facebook, how do you break apart that? And especially now that they want to do like change this end-to-end encryption model of saying, you know, moving everything almost under this WhatsApp, which is still reliable but it's dark. Yeah, yeah. So I just— and the breakup conversation is going to happen way slower than that integration is going to happen. So I think The infrastructures that are getting created, I don't think, can be broken up in that way.
John Markoff: I've also heard people point to both regulatory and deregulatory strategies. The one that I find, you know, there was that provision, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, and I've got it here. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. What if we simply deregulated in the sense of, and forced them to be treated as what they seem to be to me, publishers.
Mike Ananny: Yeah, no, I actually think— I think this CDA 230 conversation is, I think, a really interesting one where this could happen. And I think, you know, because, you know, the history of— I think why that stayed in, because most of that act got struck down by the court, but this 230 paragraph stayed in— was that it was a sort of a Clinton-era way to keep innovation happening, to sort of make sure— because if you would never have a Google if you said Google had to be responsible for all the speech that it was surfacing, you know, through its search. So, but here's the thing, and somebody like Charlton Gillespie has made this point, I think, really well, but we sort of gave them that big power to choose whether to regulate or not, because it's not like they don't make decisions about regulating. They do. They make content moderation decisions all the time. So they're definitely doing regulation. But we sort of, we gave them that power without asking for much in return. And that's, that's the piece that was sort of missing, is that we just sort of said, we'll take innovation as our payment. And that's it. And I'm like, no, that didn't— you know, like the Communications Act, we— when we gave away spectrum, we expected something in return. And we had, you know, that's where FCC comes from. And we have all this sort of— we saw it as a public good and we're willing to tax it, regulate it, allocate spectrum in particular ways. So, so I think yes, we could, but like wholesale getting rid of CEA-230, I'm more interested— I'd be curious to say like Can we be imaginative and creative, but what can we expect of these companies? Which I think you're totally right. They're not technology companies, they're media companies. They're advertising companies, really. Yeah, right. And I think it's only in the last, like, maybe year or two that they've started to publicly be like, okay, we're media companies. And, you know, like, we'll take— but for a long time they resisted that in a way that was sort of like, the gig is up. But like, you lack moonshots. Oh yeah, yeah. I think it was as a crazy kind of thing. So I think that they've made that shift, but we, and by we I mean sort of either the public or regulators, haven't figured out like what's our ask of these companies, like what do we want them to do? What should we ask them to do? I think funding for journalism would be a huge thing. I think that would be, I think especially in this country, you know, market-funded journalism has always has had a lot of struggle and complexity to survive. I think the public funding system is not, you know, it's a drop in the bucket compared to what markets will provide. So I think, you know, let's just run that as an experiment for 20 years. If we just taxed these advertising/technology companies massively and tried to figure out what a hybrid public market media system could look like, and we, if we had way more journalism than we could use, wouldn't that be a nice problem to have? I'm very happy to deal with an oversupply of good journalism as something we would expect from these companies. I'd be happy to have that as a nice problem to have.
John Markoff: You know, the New York Times is a particular kind of discussion point in that conversation. All of a sudden, this company seems to have found its way across the chasm, or has it not? I mean, Donald Trump tweeted 2 or 3 days ago that as soon as he left office, they would fail.
Mike Ananny: Didn't he also predict they were failing even when he was— You'd predict that many times, right?
John Markoff: But now he says they're going to fail when he leaves office 6 years from now. OK. That's his— Oh, 6 years. What is clear is under the Trump regime, the Times has flourished. Yeah. Really quite striking. Yeah. Maybe they're a special case.
Mike Ananny: I think there's— I mean, yeah, there's been a few. Like, the Wall Street Journal has done well. The Times has done well. The Guardian, Post. Post. So I think there's some flagship-type media organizations that have done well. I mean, I mostly had in mind when I was thinking about that of the local news, which is— Yeah, and talk about an issue of press freedom as well. Like Facebook and Google's recent forays into, you know, saying we're going to fund local journalism, we're going to fund local news. I get really nervous about asking about that relationship and creating a dependency relationship between, you know, what Facebook or Google choose to continue supporting or not supporting. I don't want to let that be left up to their whims.
John Markoff: There was this point at which John Perry Barlow, who was the lyricist for the Grateful Dead, wrote this manifesto arguing that the online world was somehow separate and undisconnected from— you obviously have quarrel with that sort of view.
Mike Ananny: Sure, yeah, because I wouldn't argue that it's this utopic sort of liberatory, let's all go online and there we don't have to have bodies and race races and gender, like we're going to go there and just be pure people of some kind. So I, in retrospect, you know, I read that manifesto as, you know, putting a stake in the ground in one particular place. And I think, you know, but that's actually a good example of there were people even at the time saying, come on, we're not all like— there is such a thing as race and gender online. Like actually there are people who you're still bringing with you a lot of context into these places, and these places are designed for certain people and not others. And so even in this founding myth of liberatory whatever, I don't quite buy it. But I think the reason I was sort of— I try to argue against this idea of sort of there's a thing called society, there's a thing called technology, and technology acts on society, is that I think it gives a pass too much to the people who think their work is just living in one particular place. And I think it's So when I talk to people in Silicon Valley who are starting up with something, they'll talk about— usually it's foregrounding a technological challenge, is sort of one thing I hear people saying a lot about. Like, it's really hard to do this thing. I want to do this thing, and I found some little domain to do it in, whether it's sort of how labor is organized or how housing is done. And they kind of don't care much sure about the place that it's playing out in, or they'll just— they've made it such a caricature that it's, of course, their technology is going to sort of act in that way. So I just, I would more love to see foregrounding of this meeting moment, like I was saying, like this— that's your unit of analysis, that's the thing you care about, is the intersection between the people and the technology. And I know that's kind of sometimes hard to wrap our heads a little around because it's so ingrained is to think about it acting on something, or think about technology as a neutral tool, and tools can be good and tools can be bad. Like, that trope still feels very powerful, and I think it would be— I don't know, it'd be good to break out of that, especially, you know, as things like machine learning and, you know, large statistical databases and facial recognition and all that stuff come into play.
John Markoff: To that point, you know, There is a remarkable fad in academia in the last year. Ethics courses are littered all over the campus landscape. It's really quite remarkable. Do you have any sense of— I mean, will there be a good outcome? Is that— is it window dressing, or is that going to substantially change the nature of the—
Mike Ananny: I mean, I like this spirit of it in the sense that I think there's at least a recognition that there's been something missing in how STEM education especially has been thought about. So I like that that has been made. I think the idea of, "Oh, we're going to have an ethicist come in and like sit beside a computer scientist and they're going to, you know, he or she will look over his or her shoulder and say, 'That's bad code you're writing,' or 'That's good code you're writing,'" like that feels like a massive oversimplification of what it means to make or deploy systems or make sense of systems. So I have sometimes talked about there is this, quote, missing middle. There are a lot of fields and disciplines like my own of communication as a field or science technology studies or STS as a field or information schools as a field. These are all places that have thought about this stuff for a long time and have a lot of case studies and a lot of concepts and a lot of patterns they found. So the idea that we're just going to sort of marry computer science with philosophy, for instance. That does drive me a little nuts because I sort of go, come on, we've been here before.
John Markoff: If you change the vision process which leads to design of new technologies, that could be really interesting, hopefully in good ways. But, you know, one of the things I stumbled across when I was doing Machines of Love and Grace and doing history, for example, how many AI pioneers were just decided to go into artificial intelligence because they saw Space Odyssey. Yeah, so it was framed by science fiction originally, for good or ill. Now it's going to be framed by these conversations, maybe, and maybe that's a good thing. Maybe—
Mike Ananny: I think there's a lot of inspirations and motivations for where these things come from. For me, one of the little cases I think about though is the drive to not produce a technology. I do kind of wonder where that's gonna come from. 'Cause when I usually hear these conversations framed, it's like, the tech is gonna get built, period. We gotta have some ethicists come along and make sure we don't mess things up too much. Who has the power in that collaboration to actually say, you know what? No, we're not gonna do this. So I think, like the San Francisco having the ban on facial recognition, whether you agree with that as the remedy or not or whatever, just the simple fact of saying no to a technological innovation, that alone is kind of a huge move. And I sort of think about who in these interdisciplinary collaborations has the power to say no or the power to stop something. And I— so in these ethics courses that I see, my one concern is it feels a little sometimes like it's ethicists are in the service of the technologists. They're going ahead, they're doing their thing. Try to just steer them a little differently, or try to like ask some questions. What if we flip that? Like, what if we actually— there's a lot of great humanists and social scientists who've thought deeply about what it means to thrive, what good life looks like, what self-governance looks like, that doesn't necessarily have this technological imperative to it. So what if we were to flip that? I've not seen— I've not seen that. That would be great. I would love to see that.
John Markoff: That's a fascinating You should— I mean, that would be nice to put that on the table as a perspective. Yeah.
Mike Ananny: I don't think it's there. Yeah, no, you're right. I don't think it's there either, but it's—
John Markoff: I wanted to ask about your year at CASBS. What was it like to be at CASBS, and how much, you know, could you interact, and were there people who were doing things that were relevant to your work?
Mike Ananny: You know, I think the stuff that's stuck with me has mostly been around the populism, nationalism. So when I was talking earlier about affect being one of the drivers of how platforms work, people driving engagement, something is high resonance or low resonance just because it's positive or negative. And so people like Bart Minkowski, Eva's work as well is another. So thinking about the different versions of Spanish nationalism got traction on different platforms. And I've never thought about how platforms would select for different kinds of nationalism. I think platforms usually think about information, and it's a very sort of atomistic, sort of on the individual level, like what resonated with you or not. And I've— and this is what this year I think has pushed me to think about— is how does all that add up to maybe a flavor of nationalism that then catches resonance with the history of a country or the goals of a political party. I've never seen anybody do that thinking about how flavors of nationalism would play out on one platform versus another platform. There haven't been a lot of communication media sort of technology academics at CASBS this year, so it's been an— a fun and nice opportunity to figure out kind of how to tell the story of my academic discipline or training or perspective to folks that are not necessarily coming from that world. And then simultaneously trying to figure out how to, almost how to enter into their world. So Kim Williams is thinking about Twitter and the role of social movements and counter-movements to Black Lives Matter, and I had a lot of great conversations with her about how to think about Twitter as more than just a data source, like more than just a channel, more than just like a way to suck data and, you know, do your regressions and everything. But to think about Twitter as, you know, it's also a company that has commercial interests. It also is a set of users who have practices and assumptions about how, you know, what good uses or bad uses of Twitter are. It has algorithmic sort of ranking systems. So it was a fun way to talk with her and others about making platforms and technologies part of your story, not just a data source. And that— so for me, that was one of the common themes I saw in my conversations with people, was the extent to which I could sort of help them think through their projects in relation to that. It was fun.
John Markoff: And you had two— well, not— you had, in a sense, you had two hats because you were involved in Bagruen. Were you— did you get into the Bagruen conversation, or did Bagruen take a lot of your year this year?
Mike Ananny: So I mean overall it was good. I had a few touch points. I didn't sort of have an ongoing regular relationship with them, but they had a— it started— they had a workshop or symposium in September with all the fellows. So there was the Berggruen fellows who were up here, but then there's also I believe people in New York. There's a large contingent of people in LA. So we all got together and their concern or sort of theme that they've been thinking about is the transformation or the future of the human and sort of thinking about that from different directions. So yeah, we did like a 2-day— I think it was a 2-day total workshop there. And then they've come up to CASBS a couple times during the year, and I was on a panel with the other Wigrun fellows this year. So Tomas and Jake and Margaret and I did a panel. Was that down here or was Was that one of the first things you did? That was up here, yeah, yeah, it was up here. So we had that, and then I've committed to, but I've not finished yet, I'm going to write a piece for a new publication that they have coming out that is, uh, I'm not sure where that is at in development right now, but yeah, so sort of some touch points along the way. I've been a little schizophrenic this year, in a good way I hope. So I'm working on the white space book, but also the probability piece. I just wrote a piece for the Knight Program's First Amendment Institute at the Columbia Law School. So they have a program there focused on the future of the First Amendment. So I did, I did use this time this year to write a little piece for them on kind of arguing that a lot of the way speech circulates today online is probabilistic. It's about statistical chances of speech circulating. It's about the chance that my speech appears in an algorithmic feed of some kind, the chance that it might get banned or censored in some way. The chance that I see it versus you see it versus somebody else sees it. Those are all sort of probabilistic ideas. So what the short piece is trying to argue is to say, instead of thinking about speech as something that was sort of more deterministic about saying, you know, I put it on the 6 o'clock news and I know that a ton of people saw it and I know that I can say this set of people saw it, or instead of it appeared on the front page of the newspaper and I can talk about the the fact that a lot of people might have seen that. I think the world we're sort of living in now is much more about the chance of speech appearing or the chance of speech making it through some kind of banning or censorship sort of regime. So that's what the probabilistic element is to try to say that. And it's— yeah. Thank you. Yeah.
John Markoff: To learn more about the topics in this episode, check out the show notes. There you'll find links to works by our guests and relevant articles. Thanks for listening.